There is a misconception that diplomacy and war are independent of each other. However, they are inextricably linked or operate in parallel—diplomacy may be irrelevant to the general course of military operations, but pivotal in limiting adversary actions such as the torture of captured Prisoners of War (PoWs) and securing their release. It performs a regulative function. However, diplomacy is likely to be ineffective, despite efforts by the warring parties to engage each other during the confrontation to end the war, because the objectives of both sides are fundamentally incompatible in diplomatic terms. Yet, there is also a second or coercive dimension to diplomacy in war, which can help terminate military hostilities quickly through threats of escalation if third-party pressures can be brought to bear against the aggressor. The subsequent analysis only deals with these two dimensions of diplomacy—both its limited impact on actual military operations and its role in terminating the Kargil War in India’s favour through diplomatic coercion.
There is a misconception that diplomacy and war are independent of each other. However, they are inextricably linked or operate in parallel
In May 1999, when India was on the cusp of the general elections, Pakistan sprang a surprise on its Indian adversary by seizing strategically important mountain heights in the Drass-Kargil sector across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. The Indian political and diplomatic establishment and the Indian Army (IA) were stunned by the sheer audacity of Pakistan’s decision to launch an attack of that scale. It was only the second time in history that two nuclear-armed adversaries fought a conventional war.
