With India and China reaching a limited agreement on the disengagement from and patrolling of the Depsang Bulge and Demchok areas in eastern Ladakh, there is widespread jubilation in some quarters. The celebration of this breakthrough announced on 21 October 2024, should be tempered by the reality that there is still a significant amount of disengagement, de-escalation, and de-induction of forces to be completed by New Delhi and Beijing. Pending further negotiations, under the latest agreement, the following friction points were left out—Galwan Valley (PP 14), Pangong Tso (North and South Banks), Gogra (PP 17A) and Hotsprings (PP 15). These four areas are currently under buffer zones that prohibit patrolling, meaning the status quo ante, has not been restored completely. Meanwhile, with Depsang and Demchok, India and China have agreed to “coordinated patrolling,” which one analyst described as an “innovation.” This is misleading and deceptive because it is not an innovation, but a restriction on patrolling. There are three patrolling restrictions under the latest agreement.
Firstly, each patrol team cannot exceed 14 troops. Secondly, the other side must be notified before embarking on a patrol. Thirdly, the number of patrols that Indian and Chinese forces can conduct cannot exceed two or three every month, to all the points they deem part of their territory in Depsang and Demchok. Indeed, though India can patrol areas in Demchok, it is not permitted to patrol Charding La—a key pass. In addition, there is a quid pro quo. Just as India has gained patrolling access to Demchok and Depsang up to Patrolling Points (PP) 10, 11, 11A, 12, and 13, which it last secured access to in January 2020, China has gained a reciprocal concession by way of an “escorted patrol” in the Yangste area of Arunachal Pradesh, as well as another location. These patrolling restrictions did not apply under the terms of the 1993 and 1996 agreements. Further, these “innovations” are ultimately a concession to the Chinese because most of the territory that the Chinese occupied in April-May 2020 was primarily India-dominated, if not India-controlled, territory.
Beijing has numerous opportunities to rake up trouble along the entire stretch of the 3,500 kilometres of contested boundary between India and China.
The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) maintains that “…verification patrolling has commenced on mutually agreed terms in Demchok and Depsang.” Nevertheless, restrictive conditions have been built into this agreement, in a quest to avoid clashes between Chinese and Indian forces. Only time will tell whether this arrangement will deliver the stabilising impact that the Modi government claims it is intended to achieve. Theoretically, clashes could still occur even under the new patrolling arrangement. Beijing has numerous opportunities to rake up trouble along the entire stretch of the 3,500 kilometres of contested boundary between India and China. India has had to accept these restrictive conditions as the price for resuming a limited patrolling agreement at Demchok and the Depsang Plains.
