The Biden Administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Lacks Clarity on China

Over a year into the Biden administration, the United States has yet to articulate a coherent China strategy. Instead, it has “muddled through” on China, repeating platitudes “about the importance of East Asia and about the enduring U.S. commitment to regional security and prosperity” offered by previous administrations. In an attempt to address the lack of strategic clarity on its overall policy in the Indo-Pacific, the White House released a new Indo-Pacific Strategy on February 11. However, those hoping that the strategy would outline a clear vision of how the Biden administration intends to address strategic competition with China are likely to be disappointed. The strategy does little to clarify specific U.S. objectives in the Indo-Pacific vis-à-vis China, the ways and means through which it will pursue those objectives, and the opportunity costs and trade-offs of doing so. To be clear, the document is a regional, not a China-specific, strategy, as a senior administration official reportedly stated. Developing a successful strategy for the Indo-Pacific is critical for the United States to secure its vital national interests in the region. As Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye argue, crafting a sound China policy requires the United States to “get Asia right.” This, as China expert Ryan Hass asserts, means that Washington “needs an Asia strategy for dealing with China, rather than a China strategy for Asia.” Yet, despite highlighting the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the strategy fails to sufficiently detail how the Biden administration’s broader plans for the Indo-Pacific will address the difficulties posed by China. Rather, it offers vague bromides, declaring that the objective of Washington’s China policy is “not to change the PRC but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates, building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share.” To create a favorable strategic environment in the region, the White intends to pursue five regional goals: “advance a free and open Indo-Pacific”; “build connections within and beyond the region”; “drive regional prosperity”; “bolster Indo-Pacific security”; and “build regional resilience to transnational threats.” However, the strategy fails to sufficiently describe in detail how it will attain these objectives and how achieving them will positively shape the PRC’s behavior.